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A “PRINCIPLED RESOLUTION”: THE
FULCRUM FOR BIOETHICS MEDIATION
NANCY NEVELOFF DUBLER*
The concept of a “principled resolution” is the foundation for bioethics
mediation.1 This article presents the core bioethical principles that support the
creation of principled resolutions as fulcrums for resolving disagreements in the
healthcare setting. These disputes may arise among medical providers, between
medical providers and patients, or among members of a patient’s family and can
be managed or resolved by bioethics mediation using the conceptual tool of a
principled resolution.
I
THE FOUNDATION
A. Bioethics Fundamentals: The Foundation for Principled Resolutions
Bioethics is a body of scholarship produced by philosophers, lawyers, judges,
medical-care providers, and theologians who, in a lively set of dialogues over the
last four decades, have identified shared values and legal rules that provide the
basis for the normative principles and precepts of modern medicine.2 These
normative statements have been derived from benchmark ethical theory, largely
propounded by John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant, which deals with
interlocking ideas about morality and human behavior. These now arcane
writings were modernized by the new field of bioethics in response to the
development of the modern healthcare enterprise.3 Issues of care related to
increasingly powerful medical technology that could maintain organ function
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1. NANCY NEVELOFF DUBLER & CAROL B. LIEBMAN, BIOETHICS MEDIATION: A GUIDE TO
SHAPING SHARED SOLUTIONS, REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION 14–15 (2011).
2. See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS (5th ed. 2001); ALBERT R. JONSEN, MARK SIEGLER & WILLIAM J. WINSLAD, CLINICAL
ETHICS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO ETHICS DECISIONS IN CLINICAL MEDICINE (6th ed. 2006);
BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS: A GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS (4th ed. 2009); LINDA
FARBER POST, JEFFREY BLUSTEIN & NANCY DUBLER, HANDBOOK FOR HEALTH CARE ETHICS
COMMITTEES (2007).
3. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 2.
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beyond the existence of an integrated, relational person led to questions of
withdrawing and withholding treatment from such patients and, under pressure
from the field of solid-organ transplantation, to the development of criteria for
the determination of brain death.4 Surrogate parenting, stem cell research,
feminist ethics, ethics of disability, racial discrimination in healthcare, and other
evolving issues have all demanded a contemporary exploration of emerging
medical issues in light of established principles and shared societal
commitments.5
Bioethics involves a set of ethical tenets that support the therapeutic
relationship and give rise to physician and caregiver obligations. These include
patient autonomy (supporting and facilitating the capable patient’s exercise of
self-determination), beneficence (promoting the patient’s best interest and wellbeing and protecting the patient from harm), non-malfeasance (avoiding doing
harm to the patient), and distributive justice (allocating fairly the benefits and
burdens of healthcare delivery).6 Finally, bioethics is about legal rules that have
been created by courts and legislative bodies at the federal and state levels.7
These rules have recognized and responded to the evolving standards of care in
medicine and defined the outer boundaries of a spectrum of possible behaviors
from which a principled resolution is selected.8
B. Introduction to the Notion of the Principled Resolution
Congress; state legislatures; federal and state courts; and scholars in law,
medicine, and philosophy have all addressed the process of how patients, family
members, and medical professionals allocate decision-making authority and
responsibility in the clinical-medicine setting.9 The rules are crisp and clear; the
implementation, affected as it is by emotion, fear, and misunderstanding, can be
messy.10
A principled resolution is a “consensus that identifies a plan that falls within
clearly accepted ethical principles, legal stipulations, and moral rules defined by
ethical discourse, legislatures, and courts, and that facilitates a clear plan for
future intervention.”11 In 2005 Carol Leibman12 and I were first struggling with
4. See generally id.; N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN OTHERS MUST
CHOOSE: DECIDING FOR PATIENTS WITHOUT CAPACITY (1992); N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE
AND THE LAW, THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH (2d ed. 1986).
5. See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & LEROY WALTERS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
BIOETHICS (6th ed. 2003); N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, SURROGATE
PARENTING, ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY (1988).
6. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 2, at 57.
7. See generally JERRY MENIKOFF, LAW AND BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION (2001).
8. See generally DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1.
9. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 2; JONSEN, SIEGLER & WINSLAD, supra note
2; LO, supra note 2; POST, BLUSTEIN & DUBLER, supra note 2.
10. See, e.g., Arthur L. Caplan & Edward J. Bergman, Beyond Schiavo, 18 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 340,
340 (2007).
11. DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 14.
12. Carol Liebman is a Clinical Professor at Columbia Law School.
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the tensions among three competing factors: (1) the stringent limits imposed by
law on medical providers and institutions,13 (2) the powerful decision-making
authority permitted to individual patients and families in medical decisionmaking, and (3) the power imbalances that infuse the operations of the modern
hospital and medical center. The notion of a principled resolution combines the
strengths of a mediative process that levels the playing field with legal norms
and ethical conventions, and uses both as support for forging a consensus. A
principled resolution reflects the deep and thorough support in the law and in
society for decisions of patients and families, especially when these decisions
contest the juggernaut of modern, institutionalized medical care.
II
THE PRACTICE OF APPLIED BIOETHICS
A. Applying Bioethics: The Practice of Clinical-Ethics Consultation (CEC)
Bioethics emerged as a distinct voice, largely in the 1970s and 1980s, in
discussions about the allocation of decision-making authority and responsibility
in medicine. It developed as the technical abilities of medicine to support organ
function and address illness and disease expanded without concomitant
agreement regarding who decides within what limits these new technical abilities
should operate. Before the mid-twentieth century, medicine could diagnose and
comfort, but could rarely cure. But after World War II, when antibiotics became
available, intensive care units were created, antipsychotic drugs were developed,
and resuscitation was widely integrated into care, there was the need to
designate and empower those who could consent to or refuse care because there
were real choices to be made. As the technical abilities of medicine expanded
and access to healthcare reached more patients with the passage of Medicare
and Medicaid, who decides, based on what standards, and with what sort of
appeal and review became increasingly important.14 If decisions needed to be
made, who should make them and how?
By tradition and habits of practice, physicians made the majority of decisions
based on judgments regarding what was in the best interest of the patient. But
litigation sharpening the doctrine of “informed consent” demonstrated that
individualswhose values, personal history, wants, and individual notions of the
good life were defeated by physicians’ choiceswanted to decide for

13. See generally John J. Paris, Court Intervention and the Diminution of Parents’ Rights: The Case
of Brother Joseph Fox, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 876 (1980).
14. See generally DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW LAW
AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING (Aldine Transaction 2003) (1991);
Nancy Neveloff Dubler, The Legal Aspects of End-of-Life Decision Making, in CHALLENGES OF AN
AGING SOCIETY: ETHICAL DILEMMAS, POLITICAL ISSUES 20 (Rachel A. Pruchno & Michael A. Smyer
eds., 2007).
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themselves.15 At the same time, healthcare institutions realized that the
documentation in an informed-consent form, which did not necessarily indicate
a robust discussion or a process of engagement between physician and patient,
might be protective in later litigation because it could indicate that the patient
had knowingly assumed the risk of the intervention. From these factors the
simulacrum of dialogue developed regarding who decides.
On closer inspection, however, if one directed a clinical ethics consultation
service, as I did from 1978 to 2008,16 the landscape looked distinctly askew. Most
patients and family members were deeply intimidated by the culture and
operation of medicine. As the first mentor in mediation to the Montefiore
Clinical Ethics-Consultation Service stated, “Doctors speak doctor; nurses speak
nurse; and no one speaks patient or family.”17 The terms and conditions of
medicine were confusing, the sights and smells were off-putting, the fear of a
bad outcome was ever present, and the impression of the “unstopability” of care
was overwhelming. Clinical-ethics (CE) consultants wondered how to counter
all of these seemingly inevitable aspects of highly technological, highly
impenetrable, institutional healthcare delivery.
Concurrent with the growth of bioethics scholarship was the development of
institutional ethics committees. These developed largely in hospitals, but also in
long-term-care facilities and occasionally in home-care agencies. They addressed
actual cases and the dilemmas that emerged in trying to adjust the perceived
duties and obligations of healthcare providers and healthcare institutions to the
values, wishes, wants, and desires of patients, and—even more—of family
members on behalf of incapacitated patients. In 1992, the Joint Commission on
the Accreditation of Hospital Organizations created a new standard that
required all institutions to have the capacity to address ethical issues.18 After
that, ethics committees became the norm of institutional healthcare practice.
At the outset these committees addressed education, policy development,
and case consultation. The last generally consisted of a retrospective analysis of
case situations in which certain practice decisions seemed to be at odds with the
concerns and values of the patient and family. Early on, committees would
address the issue of a patient who wanted to refuse treatment and accept death,
which was seen to be in conflict with the physician’s obligation to support life.
Gradually courts and commentators agreed upon a set of rules and norms that
set parameters for case resolution. They include the following precepts:

15. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782–84 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Salgo v. Leland Stanford
Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
16. Division of Bioethics, Montefiore Medical Center, Bronx, New York.
17. Leonard Marcus, Dir. of the Program for Health Care Negotiation and Conflict Resolution,
Harvard Univ. School of Pub. Health, Remarks at the Montefiore Medical Center Mediation Training
(Spring 1991).
18. JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., ACCREDITATION MANUAL
FOR HOSPITALS (1992 ed., 1991).
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1. Competent adult patients have the right to consent to or to refuse
care even if the result of that refusal is death;19
2. Patients who are not capable of making decisions may execute an
advance directive, such as a living will or a durable power of attorney
for healthcare decision-making, to extend their values and wishes
beyond their ability to insist on an outcome;20
3. If the patient has not executed an advance directive, state law will
determine which persons have what degree of authority to decide for
the patient;21
4. Children are entitled to decisions made in support of their “best
interest”;22
5. Death may be preferable to extending the process of dying in
children and incompetent patients;23
6. Neonates and adolescents present complex circumstances in which
the parents, pediatricians, patients (in the case of adolescents),
advocates, and the state may all offer positions legally and morally
demanding cognizance.
These sorts of developing principles and norms became the basis for ethics
committees branching out to intervene prospectively into developing cases. Thus
came the growth of CEC services, as independent services or as a function of a
subcommittee of the ethics committee.24 But what was the framework for this
intervention? Joan McIver Gibson in New Mexico experimented with the ethics
committee’s ability to mediate differences.25 But committees are unwieldy and of
uncertain dynamics. Much to be preferred are trained professionals, who are
knowledgeable about medicine, relevant law, and regulations that govern the
doctor–patient encounter, and who are also trained with the skills and
interventions of a mediator.
Of greatest concern was the non-self-executing nature of the rules regarding
the allocation of medical decision-making authority. These were excellent rules
for courts and scholarly articles. However, in the guts of the hospital, on the
wards, in the clinics, and in difficult and fraught situations, hardly anyone knew

19. POST, BLUSTEIN & DUBLER, supra note 2, at 288 (citing Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 297, 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)).
20. Id. at 291 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 294 (citing Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978)).
23. Id. at 290 (citing In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985)).
24. Nancy Neveloff Dubler et al., Charting the Future: Credentialing, Privileging, Quality, and
Evaluation in Clinical Ethics Consultation, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 23, 31; see also
POST, BLUSTEIN & DUBLER, supra note 2, at 1.
25. See generally Mary Beth West & Joan McIver Gibson, Facilitating Medical Ethics Case Review:
What Ethics Committees Can Learn from Mediation and Facilitation Techniques, 1 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 63 (1992).
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them; how were they to become the real bases for decisions made in the course
of clinical care?26
CE consultants engage in various tasks in the course of their work as they
confront misunderstandings, disagreements, disputes, and full-blown conflict in
the course of helping to set the specific course for the care of a sick and
debilitated patient.27 Sometimes CE consultants merely clarify the protocols that
govern medical decision-making—for example, the rules that are relevant to
selecting and empowering family members to choose a course of care for a
relative who is not capable of making decisions. Many times they clarify the
issues and help the parties see the options and choices. Always, they teach about
the law, medicine, and ethics and how these interact in a patient-care setting.
CEC is an intervention in which a trained clinical-ethics professional
 responds in a timely fashion to the request for a CEC from any member of
the medical-care team, the patient, or a family member;
 reviews the patient’s medical record;
 either interviews relevant medical stakeholders or gathers the clinical-care
team and other consultants to discuss the case;
 visits the patient and family whenever possible;
 as a preliminary matter, identifies the ethical issues at play and any
sources of conflict;
 involves the patient or family with care providers to promote
communication, explore options, and seek consensus, when appropriate;
 employs expert discussion of bioethical principles, practices, and norms
and uses reason, facilitation, negotiation, or mediation to seek a common
judgment regarding a plan of care going forward;
 attends to the social, psychological, and spiritual issues that are often at
play in disagreements about the proper course of care;
 triggers a further process with hospital medical leaders or a bioethics
committee to resolve the situation, if a resolution is not reached;
 follows up with a patient and family after the initial consultation (although
this feature of CEC varies, since in some systems follow-up is a task solely
for the medical team);
 records the process and substance of the consultation, including the
consultant’s recommendations and their justification, as part of the
patient’s medical record;
 reviews the consultation with others on the CEC service as a basic level of
evaluation and peer review; and
28
 utilizes a formal and rigorous quality-improvement process.

26. Arthur S. Slutsky & Leonard D. Hudson, Care of an Unresponsive Patient with a Poor
Prognosis, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 527, 528–29 (2009).
27. Dubler et al., supra note 24, at 25.
28. Id.
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The most challenging situations CE consultants face, however, are those in
which a subset of care providers and family members have faced off over the
divide of a demented or debilitated patient, a neonate, or an adolescent, and are
locked in combat over what is the proper course of treatment for this patient. In
some instances, the staff and family are interpreting the values, history, explicit
wishes, and life patterns of the patient. In others, they may be struggling with
what is in the best interest of the patient and whether the notion of best interest
includes the option of death. In these cases, the CE consultant must be prepared
to engage in bioethics mediation designed to focus and sharpen the usual tasks
of consultation and to arrive at a consensus that permits care to go forward.
CE consultants address some of the most divisive and contentious issues in
American society.29 CEC is a service within the hospital that, when difficult
decisions must be made, “provides an additional resource and a conduit for
complex communication among patients, their families (including relatives,
significant others, close friends, and appointed surrogates), and the care team.”30
CEC deals with life and death decisions pitting the family members’ needs to
feel that “everything that can be done has been done” against the medical
team’s perception that comfort is the only appropriate medical plan for a patient
who is in the process of dying. Alternatively, CEC may involve medical
providers who urge aggressive care opposing family members who feel that “the
patient has suffered enough.” CE consultants also address situations in which
family members clash with hospital policy. Consider, for example, the increasing
tendency of intensive-care units (ICUs) to have policies dictating the discharge
of patients to less-monitored beds whenever they are no longer benefiting from
enhanced, carefully calibrated interventions. Although family members know
that transfer signals a diminished chance for patient survival, this policy is based
on the fact that ICU beds are a scarce resource that must be allocated fairly to
those in need.31
Conflict is inevitable in modern American healthcare institutions.32 All
healthcare is economically stressed, overburdened by underinsured and
uninsured patients, overloaded with expensive technology, and under suspicion
by patients and family members who have previously been excluded from care
due to poverty or race. Just consider contemporary discussions about abortion,

29. Gordon DuVal et al., What Triggers Requests for Ethics Consultations?, 27 J. MED. ETHICS. i24,
i27 (2001) (finding conflict and emotionally based triggers prompt ethical consultation more frequently
than cognitive-based dilemmas).
30. Dubler et al., supra note 24, at 23.
31. POST, BLUSTEIN & DUBLER, supra note 2, at 192.
32. See, e.g., Slutsky & Hudson, supra, note 26, at 527; see also Atul Gawande, Letting Go: What
Should Medicine Do When It Can’t Save Your Life?, NEW YORKER, Aug. 2, 2010, at 33, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/08/02/100802fa_fact_gawande (discussing differences in
perspective and views on care among providers, patients, and family members when patients are dying).
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the care of Terri Schiavo,33 or the treatment of imperiled newborns and the
likelihood of these topics to import emotion into discourse.
B. From Clinical-Ethics Consultation to Bioethics Mediation
Montefiore Medical Center was at the forefront of developing a prospective
CEC service.34 Physicians, social workers, nurses, and others would call the CEC
service, staffed by a philosopher and a lawyer, whenever they faced an “ethical
dilemma.” As the service matured, the medical-care staff realized that, in
addition to specialized knowledge of philosophy and law, these consultants
brought an added value to the discussion of clinical matters that were in the
process of escalating toward a seeming impasse; they brought the notion of
“neutral turf”—a unique voice in these difficult clinical situations. This voice
was the result of several unique aspects of the CEC.
First, the role of CEC was to harmonize conflicting obligations and values.
CE consultants were committed to support shared decisions that honored the
patient’s autonomy, the family’s reflection of patient values, and the clinical
team’s obligations to promote the patient’s well-being. As a champion of the
interests of both sides, the CE consultant was able to garner the trust and
participation of both clinical teams and families. Second, CE consultants were
naïve to the prior developments in the case. This meant that they were not
responsible for an outcome—almost always negative—since no one calls for help
when all is moving along smoothly. Third, CE consultants needed to hear the
narrative, even after reading the chart, to understand what had really happened.
This “fresh” lens allowed all parties to hear each other with more complete,
current information, and often learn missing pieces of information. Fourth, CE
consultants had no history of conflict with the care providers, patient, or family
in this case. Thus, they were invested in neither the stakeholders’ solutions nor
their positions and could present a new frame for discussion. Because of these
four characteristics of the CE consultants’ work, CEC provided a variety of
neutral turf for discussion and decision.
Neutral turf is what mediators bring to a dispute: distance from the parties
and the issues, specific skills in managing conflicts, and a process for directing
difficult conversations.35 Thus began an odyssey toward the creation of bioethics
mediation directed at understanding and managing situations of conflict as a
specific set of skills for CEC.

33. See George J. Annas, “Culture of Life” Politics at the Bedside—The Case of Terri Schiavo, 352
NEW ENG. J. MED 1710 (2005); Lawrence O. Gostin, Ethics, the Constitution, and the Dying Process:
The Case of Theresa Marie Schiavo, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2403, 2403 (2005).
34. The first consultation service in Montefiore Medical Center began in 1978.
35. DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at xiv, 13.
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C. Bioethics Mediation
Bioethics mediation is one of the tools of CEC, a subspecialty of bioethics,
and an example of applied ethics in which a trained professional, generally a
physician, nurse, social worker, lawyer, or philosopher, acts as a consultant to
the medical team to address discomforts about care planning and the
implementation of previously forged care agreements.36
In bioethics mediation, a principled resolution reflects a clinical plan of
action agreed upon by relevant stakeholders and chosen from among multiple
morally permissible options that fall within the spectrum of acceptable clinical,
ethical, and legal outcomes. Bioethics conflict is almost always about the
“proper” or “appropriate” plan for future care.37 The parties generally include
the attending physician, other members of the healthcare team, and some
advocate for the patient.38 This advocate can be a family member or friend.
Sometimes the patient is alone without family, such as an “unbefriended
elderly” or “unrepresented patient.”39 The mediation is largely with non-patient
advocates because capacitated adult patients have the legal right to accept or
reject medical alternatives even if their decisions are thought to be wrong by
others.40 Thus, bioethics mediation often addresses situations in which the adult
patient is allegedly incapacitated, is clearly incapacitated, or is a minor or an
otherwise legally compromised person.41
The bioethics mediator is always neutral to the particular case, but is likely
to be known to the medical staff.42 Indeed, case-mediation requests often come
from satisfied repeat users of the service. One of the differences between
bioethics mediation and other sorts of mediation is that the mediator is generally
a member of the CEC team, giving her access to the healthcare institution, the
right to intervene in the case, and the power to write a note in the medical chart,
which is the legal record of the patient’s care.43 In the chart note, the bioethics
mediator notes the principled resolution as the consensus reached and,
therefore, the CE recommendation. In general, the physician, who has the legal
authority and responsibility for the patient’s care, will be a part of the
mediation; thus committed to the consensus, she will write any orders as needed
to effectuate the resolution.

36. AM. SOC’Y FOR BIOETHICS & HUMANITIES, TASK FORCE ON STANDARDS FOR BIOETHICS
CONSULTATION 3 (2010) (noting that clinical ethics consultants and consultation are referred to as
“health care ethics” consultants).
37. Dubler et al, supra note 24, at 26.
38. Id.
39. See Naomi Karp & Erica Wood, Incapacitated and Alone: Healthcare Decision Making for
Unbefriended Older People, 31 HUM. RTS. 20, 20 (2004) (noting that the unrepresented patient is
preferable because the patient may also be a younger, isolated, and perhaps mentally-ill person).
40. LO, supra note 2, at 83; POST, BLUSTEIN & DUBLER, supra note 2, at 89–90.
41. DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 17, 141.
42. Id. at 23.
43. Dubler et al., supra note 24, at 26–27.
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The bioethics mediator recognizes that there are always multiple options for
the plan of care.44 This may be in distinct contrast to the medical providers who
more often tend to see only the best plan. This is not surprising because
physicians are trained to evaluate medical data and act to reach the optimum
goal. It goes counter to training, instinct, and paternalistic habits to see nonmedical factors as relevant and valid. Even as physicians and practitioners began
increasingly to recognize that medical choices reflect personal values and
history, they still jockeyed to maintain control of the decision-making process.
They did so out of the lofty motive to do what is in the “best interest” of the
patient and the not-so-elevated characteristic of having no real experience in
sharing power. The mediator helps the parties to maximize options either by
defining actually distinct end points or by introducing new timetables that better
permit the accumulation of data.45 Thus the bioethics mediator plays the crucial
role of opening space and time for considering other factors.46
Consider the following vignette of a large, loving, and chaotic family (let us
say) from Bosnia in which the healthcare proxy, the oldest son, is
decompensating at the imminent death of his mom and is drinking heavily. He
has had a number of clashes with the nursing staff in the ICU; some of the staff
are merely wary and some are actively scared of him. The mediator and the
attending physician have tried to move the family, all seventeen of them who are
present, to accept the fact that mom is dying. The oldest son (the healthcare
proxy) finally explodes and demands that the physician give mom a special tonic
she used to take when she lived at home. Left to her own devices, the physician
is likely to reject this out of hand. Nothing has prepared her for the experience
of providing an unknown substance to a dying patient. However, the mediator
has been at this for some time and says the following:
How lucky is your mom to have family who love her so much, are willing to spend so
much time and effort to make her better. Now, I hear the doctor saying that this tonic
is unlikely to help your mom, that she is dying and beyond the help of any medicine.
However, it might be possible for the pharmacy to analyze this tonic and if they agree
that it could not harm her, we might be able to give it to the patient.

By stroking, repeating, and reinforcing, the bioethics mediator has bought
some time, supported the family (or at least the oldest son), deflected the
annoyance and punitive reaction of the physician, and, with a bit of luck and a
call on the “favor bank” at the pharmacy, would make this action possible. Her
logic, from the bioethics perspective, is simple:
The patient was given the tonic at home as her family believed that it would help cure
her ailment. She is now dying and cannot be discharged home where the family could
continue with old remedies. But, as the patient is dying, the potential that this tonic will
actively harm her is limited. Receiving the tonic supports the patient’s and the family’s
beliefs and their explanatory model of illness, and it offers the son and family a sense
of peace that they supported her well-being.

44. DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 72–74.
45. Id. at 69.
46. Id. at 69–70.

DUBLER

5/3/2011

Summer 2011]

A “PRINCIPLED RESOLUTION”

187

Now, this person is an obtunded, ventilator-dependent, dying patient: what
harm could this tonic possibly cause? The bioethics mediator’s action on behalf
of the family changes the power structure, unpacks the enmity between staff and
family, and calms the oldest son. In bioethics mediation the process is part of the
product.
Bioethics mediation stands in the tradition of mediation in that it searches
for consensus in chaos. The type of mediation described in the paragraph above
is somewhat similar to the idea of the “permanent umpire”—a selected and
fixed arbitrator who would give instant mediation and assist in ongoing dispute
resolution. Bioethics mediation is a sort of hybrid between traditional mediation
and the presence of a “permanent umpire.”47
Bioethics mediation is distinct from other sorts of mediation because of the
following factors:

















The bioethics mediator is generally employed by the hospital.
The bioethics mediator and members of the treatment team are repeat
players.
The bioethics mediator provides information, enforces norms, and
ensures that resolutions fall within medical “best practice” guidelines.
Deciding not to reach a resolution is not an option.
The playing field is usually uneven for patients and their families.
Confidentiality is limited to information not relevant to patient care.
Time is of the essence.
Bioethics mediations involve life-and-death issues.
Facts play a different role.
The person with the greatest stake in the dispute, the patient, is often not
at the table.
There may be a sequence of separate, prior meetings in addition to the
group mediation.
Bioethics mediations are almost always multiparty events.
The parties usually do not sign an agreement to mediate.
The physical setting may not be in the mediator’s control.
Bioethics mediators are often involved in following up on
implementation of the agreement.
All participants in a bioethics mediation have a common interest in the
well-being of the patient.48

These factors demand that the mediator be aware of the constraints on her
behavior as she seeks to forge a principled resolution. In addition, the difference
between traditional mediation and bioethics mediation requires attention to
certain special features: First, bioethics may be an area for co-mediation,
47. William H. McPherson, Grievance Mediation Under Collective Bargaining, 9 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 200, 201–02 (1956).
48. DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 21–22.
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especially with lawyer mediators, because lawyers may be inadequately trained
to be mediators in a setting that requires sensitivity, empathy, patience, love,
and the ability to absorb powerful feelings and direct difficult conversations;
linking with a social worker or nurse may provide the empathy that must
accompany analysis. Second, there is a special need for subject-matter expertise
for bioethics mediators because of their role in translating the ethical and legal
norms of medical practice for the family and the medical staff. The mediator is
not just mediating, but harmonizing these norms within the culture and practice
of the particular medical institution and the facts of the case at hand. Finally,
there may also be certain questions about the perceived neutrality of a mediator
who is both employed by the hospital and a repeat player. The use of an
outsider might provide a better, more neutral reality but would be difficult to
accomplish given the risk-averse nature of medical institutions, the fact that the
healthcare chart is a legal record that can only be added to by approved staff,
and the need for the mediator to understand the conventions of the setting and
the specifics of the conflict.
Bioethics mediation is the progeny of bioethics as a field of scholarship
combined with the skills and perspectives of mediation. It uses those skills,
however, within the framework of case law and regulation,49 much as childcustody mediation uses the notion of the child’s best interest against which to
measure the appropriateness of adult agreements.
D. Applying the Notion of a Principled Resolution in Bioethics Mediation
As noted above, bioethics mediation is constrained by case law, statutes, and
regulations that have defined the interests, rights, and duties of the parties
involved in healthcare delivery scenarios. For example, the modern notion of
“informed consent,” so central to the empowerment of patients in the context of
their care, has its origins in a New York opinion stating that
[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient’s consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages. This is true
except in cases of emergency where the patient is unconscious and where it is necessary
50
to operate before consent can be obtained.

Two important and well-accepted medical, ethical, and legal rules emerged
from this opening discussion and from subsequent cases and statutes. First,
adults who are decisionally capable have the right to decide what care they
would like to receive and those interventions they wish to refuse. Second, in the
emergency room (ER)—where time is of the essence, the capacity of patients to
understand and process information is not clear, and some interventions may be
necessary emergently to save a life—individual consent is not a prerequisite to a
lifesaving or health-preserving intervention.

49. Id. at 23, 24.
50. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 129–30 (1914).
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Were there to be a disagreement in the ER, for example, in which a wife
argued that lifesaving surgery could not be performed on her unconscious
husband without his consent or approval, it would be improper for the medical
staff and the wife to reach a consensus that the husband should be permitted to
die because he could not give his explicit informed consent for the surgery or
other intervention. The allocation of decision-making authority in the ER states
that the informed consent of the patient is explicitly excluded as a precondition
to care.51 The parties could not, as part of a mediated settlement, abrogate that
well-grounded legal rule and ethical precept.
Sadly, however, most scenarios are not this clear and crisp. Perhaps the
patient in the ER had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and had
been in a steep decline at home. Furthermore, suppose he had been quite clear
with his wife that he did not want her to call for an ambulance if he had
breathing difficulties because he was ready to die at home. Suppose further that
the wife was desperate for her husband to keep on living, and over his objection
and with her contrary knowledge, called for an ambulance. Would it then be fair
for the ethics of the ER to prevail? But, how would the ER know of the
patient’s conflicting values? Would it then be wrong for ER staff to intubate the
patient in an effort to save his life?
So, too, a decisionally capable hospital patient who is refusing a second
above-the-knee amputation, having experienced one amputation previously,
could not be forced to have the amputation even if his wife and healthcare team
reached a consensus that this intervention was in his best interest. On the other
hand, assume that the patient is of diminished and fluctuating capacity—as is
often the reality. He is sometimes clear and consistent, but other times much less
so. He also seems ambivalent about death and is questioning whether the
gangrenous leg will really kill him if left attached. What then? If he is not “of
sound mind,” does he lose all of his rights? Can we take his statements that are
made in windows of lucidity and use them to support a consistent, continuous
plan of care when he is confused and disoriented? If we are to consider what is
in his “best interest,” are we bound to take his statements when capacitated into
account? How can that be done consistent with obligations and responsibilities
to protect his life and honor his person? Can it ever be in the “best interest” of a
person to be dead? Ferreting out the medical facts, the status of the patient in
regard to decision-making, the possible consequences of various options for
interventions, and how all of these elements fit within the legal rules and ethical
stipulations always requires discussion and often demands mediation.
In bioethics mediation, the process is critical. Mediation brings all of the
parties together and requires them to talk and hear each other. Talking to and
about the patient with the entire healthcare team present often uncovers
statements that would not necessarily be available otherwise. Perhaps there was
51. James G. Adams & Joel Wegener, Acting Without Asking: An Ethical Analysis of the Food and
Drug Administration Waiver of Informed Consent for Emergency Research, 33 ANNALS EMERGENCY
MED. 218, 220 (1999).
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a discussion with a nurse in the quiet of the night when the patient talked about
his hopes and fears, wishes and desires. Mediation creates a forum to illuminate
these decisions at times when the patient’s values and preferences are cloudy. It
carves time and space from the always-moving and always-acting medical world
of changing players and creates a moment in which contemplation, and not
action, counts.
Not only are bioethics-mediation interventions constrained by the notion of
the principled resolution, they are, in addition, time consuming and counter to
decades of medical tradition that, despite case law and statutes to the contrary,
still privilege the opinions of medical providers in the process of reaching
decisions. This is the case for a myriad of reasons including the following:
1. Physicians do know more about medicine than most patients and
family members, and most often want to do the right thing either to
make the patient better or end her suffering;
2. Family members do not “speak medicine” and are often uncertain
about the meaning of terms and the weight of facts presented;
3. Situations are confusing or uncertain and it may not be clear what is
actually happening to the patient and what is in her best interest;
4. Power imbalances are endemic to medicine and reflect the education,
skill, and experience of providers and the funding arrangements that
increasingly limit their time to talk with patients and family
members;
5. Distances created by education, culture, ethnicity, religious beliefs,
and poverty invade the discussions and make patients and family
members shy about revealing their values and preferences because
they are uncertain that these will be well-received and respected; and
finally,
6. The language of the American healthcare system assumes that
healthcare is a commodity to be bought and sold and not a right to
be enjoyed.
As long as this last point remains the case, and even the Obama plan
assumes that subsidies will permit those without resources to “buy” adequate
healthcare, then there will always be a “buyer beware” element to the doctor–
patient and doctor–family interaction; this will add edges to the discussion and
tend to augment what might be seen as conflicting agendas. So, “as long as
health care is viewed as a product to be bought and sold, even the most wellintentioned reformers will someday soon have to come to grips with health care
rationing, if not by wealth then by some other criteria.”52 Enough has been

52. James Ridgeway, Meet the Real Death Panels: Should Geezers Like Me Give Up LifeProlonging Treatments To Cut Health Care Costs?, MOTHER JONES (July–Aug. 2010), http://
motherjones.com/politics/2010/07/health-care-rationing-death-panels.
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spoken and written about the costs of care—especially about the costs of care at
the end of life—that patients and, even more to the point, family members are
aware that monies not spent on this patient will be available for other patients
and for the institution. They know this and they fear it. Will the healthcare
system skimp on care for their loved one so that it will be available to another,
“more deserving” patient?
In the end, however, the notion of a principled resolution only assumes form
in the context of real cases. Bioethics is about stories: consider the following
case examples, taken from real cases by the practitioners who were responsible
for crafting care plans. In each of these actual cases, culled from various
Northeastern academic teaching hospitals as preparation for various workshops,
consider how the care team might proceed with mediation; in what setting; with
what care providers, family members, and others; and how the discussion might
be constrained by the notion of a principled resolution.
III
CASES FOR CONTEMPLATION53
A. Emergency Intubation of an Adult Patient
1. Fact Pattern
A gentleman with thyroid cancer presented to the ER with stridor (a
wheezing sound on breathing in), respiratory distress, and impending airway
compromise. The patient needed emergency fiber-optic intubation or an awake
tracheotomy. The patient repeatedly stated that he did not want to be intubated
and on a ventilator for a sustained amount of time. He agreed to a tracheotomy.
Due to invasion of the thyroid cancer and collapse of the trachea, the
tracheotomy did not succeed. The patient desaturated (had less oxygen in his
blood) on the table, became unresponsive, and the healthcare team was still
unable to place a tracheotomy tube. The attending physician made the decision
to intubate the patient in an attempt to save his life.
2. Analysis
What might be a principled resolution in this case? First assume that this
patient came to the ER alone because there is no mention of family in the
narrative, and there surely would have been if any family members had been
present. A best guess is that in this case, the ER staff would have made a STAT
(immediate) call to the CEC service because the staff would have been divided
on the propriety of intubating the patient. Some would have argued that he had

53. The following fact patterns were submitted anonymously by various providers over the years in
the course of the author conducting bioethics mediation seminars. They were saved with no notation
regarding physician, author, or institution.
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distinctly refused intubation. Others would have pointed out that he had not
refused all intubation, but only intubation for a sustained amount of time.
The CE consultant would have discussed the case with the referring
physician, likely the fellow in the ER, asked a few questions, and asked that, if
possible, one of the surgical attendings or fellows be present to discuss the
possibilities of treatment for this sort of tumor. She would then go to the ER
where she would gather the team and hear the medical facts, and the diagnosis
and prognosis or as much as could be determined in the ER. Most discussions of
“medical facts” in the ER consist of educated guesses, as the specific tests that
indicate prognosis are generally not available. She would ask the ER fellow to
present the case and suggest a resolution, and would solicit all arguments to the
contrary. The ensuing discussion would place the medical discussions in the
context of the legal consensus that capable patients have the right to make
decisions, and the ethical consensus that lifesaving actions in the ER are
justified. She would point out that the language of this patient is empowering
because he did not reject intubation outright, but rather rejected intubation “for
a sustained amount of time.” The crux of the debate focused on whether this
sort of patient was likely to regain capacity or whether he would be ventilator
dependent forever. Some argued that due to the dimensions of his tumor,
placing him on a ventilator would render him permanently dependent because
the tumor would make it impossible to breathe independently. Others were
more optimistic.
As the case developed, the intubation was successful and the patient was
transferred to the ICU and placed on the ventilator. After he was eventually
taken off sedation, the reason for intubation was explained at length to the
patient and he understood. He later underwent a successful tracheotomy and
thyroidectomy.
B. Neonatal Intubation and Treatment
1. Fact Pattern
A full-term, three-kilogram black male was born as a first child to a
dedicated mother and father of simple means and limited educational
background. The child was diagnosed via prenatal ultrasound with Larsen’s
syndrome, which is characterized by joint dislocations, clubfeet, cervical
instability with risks of paralysis, microcephaly, and bronchomalacia associated
with premature death from pulmonary failure. The literature is full of case
reports describing morbidity and mortality attributed to Larsen’s syndrome, but
information about typical life quality and duration is elusive. A precedent for
pregnancy termination following the diagnosis of Larsen’s syndrome does exist.54

54. Martina Doren, Helga Rehder & Wolfgang Holzgreve, Prenatal Diagnosis and Obstetric
Management of Larsen’s Syndrome in a Patient with an Unrecognized Family History of the Disease, 46
GYNECOLOGIC & OBSTETRIC INVESTIGATION 274, 275 (1998).
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At birth the patient was transferred to the neonatal intensive-care unit
(NICU). He had inspiratory stridor and cyanosis (a bluish discoloration of the
skin or mucous membranes). He was also noted to have clubfeet and
dislocations at every elbow, knee, and hip joint. Oxygen saturation could be
maintained with tight mask ventilation, positive pressure, an oral airway, and
neck extension; but it was clear the patient would not survive more than an hour
without endotracheal intubation.
This child was intubated and failed extubation twice. Otolaryngology was
consulted and it diagnosed laryngomalacia (onset, at or soon after birth, of a
harsh respiratory sound mostly audible during inspiration). Despite reports of
this disorder dating back to the mid-nineteenth century, specific etiology and
pathogenesis remain nebulous. Analysis of findings in thirty infants indicates
there are often associated manifestations of delayed development in
neuromuscular control. Associated findings include gastroesophageal reflux,
obstructive and central apnea, hypotonia, failure to thrive, and pneumonitis.55
The laryngomalacia was too severe for surgical remedy, so the family was
offered and accepted a tracheotomy. At the one-month follow-up, the patient
remains ventilator dependent because of bronchomalacia (excessive
collapsibility of bronchi).56 Consultants have predicted he will never walk.
Tracheotomy removal will be difficult.
These were the questions posed by the providers, [part of the fact pattern]
who indicated that there were disagreements among the staff on virtually all of
the questions:
Should the parents be engaged in a discussion about quality of life and the
consequences of intubation versus no intubation? Whose responsibility is it to
initiate this discussion? How could discussions such as this be held throughout
our country in an unbiased and uniform fashion, when individuals have such
divergent views about life and choice? Once the patient is intubated and there is
time for contemplation, is there any possibility of revisiting the same question,
or is it ethically wrong to withdraw airway support, especially from a child?
Does a family’s educational background have any bearing on the questions that
should be raised? Should healthcare providers use their training and
background to educate families about likely outcomes and introduce the option
of withdrawing support, or does that expose them to accusations of elitism,
malpractice, or even homicide? In this world of finite resources, do healthcare
providers have any obligation to control healthcare costs by putting a value on
life? Has the healthcare system done the patient and the family a service in the
support it provided? Has it done a service for society? Are some outcomes
worse than death?

55. Judson R. Belmont & Kenneth Grundfast, Congenital Laryngeal Stridor (Laryngomalacia):
Etiologic Factors and Associated Disorders, 93 ANNALS OTOLOGY, RHINOLOGY & LARYNGOLOGY
430, 435–36 (1984).
56. Mizuki Nishino et al., Excessive Collapsibility of Bronchi in Bronchiectasis: Evaluation on
Volumetric Expiratory High-Resolution, 30 J. COMPUTER ASSISTED TOMOGRAPHY 474, 474 (2006).
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2. Analysis
This is a particularly interesting case because it is difficult to articulate what
the principled resolution might be. Neonatal care has been the subject of much
case law in various states, and has been the subject for medical and legal
guidelines and rancorous debate surrounding both of these processes. Consider
some of the statements that might undergird a principled resolution:
1. Goals seek to maintain a focus upon the best interests of the child.
In determining the best interests of the child, the parents generally
are considered to be the spokespersons; hence, healthcare providers
usually seek their opinions, discern their values, and consider their
goals.57
2. The aim of guidelines should not be to dictate medical care but to
facilitate decision-making and perhaps give consistency to the
process in which difficult decision-making takes place. An end result
may be that families are empowered in decision-making; however,
certainly all parties involved in these decisions for critically ill
newborns should benefit from enhanced communication and clearly
defined goals.
3. In many specific healthcare environments, a concept of the good
must be refined to reflect the peculiarities of the patients, their
conditions, the available treatment alternatives, the values placed
upon those alternatives by relevant parties, the likely outcomes of
treatment or non-treatment, and the influences of external
considerations. In the NICU, as elsewhere, goods that are pursued
include health, prevention or elimination of disease or morbidity
(including side effects of treatment), relief of unnecessary pain or
suffering, and the prolongation of life.58
The law in regard to neonates was articulated through a series of cases
culminating in congressional action following the Baby Doe59 case in Stony
Brook, New York.
In response to growing interest in these difficult decisions, in 1984–1985, the U.S.
Congress amended the federal child abuse law specifically to make each state’s child
protection agency responsible for overseeing the withholding and withdrawing of
medically indicated treatments from neonates. The law details the physician’s
responsibility to use reasonable medical judgment to make recommendations for care
of critically ill neonates. Furthermore, the federal regulations strongly urge the
formation of infant care review committees (which the American Academy of

57. See Brian S. Carter & Steven R. Leutner, The Ethics of Withholding/Withdrawing Nutrition in
the Newborn, 27 SEMINARS PERINATOLOGY 480, 482–85 (2003) (eloquently describing the process of
parents “negotiating” the child’s best interest).
58. Phoebe A. Haddon, Baby Doe Cases: Compromise and Moral Dilemma, 34 EMORY L.J. 545,
585–88 (1985); Brian S. Carter, Ethical Issues in Neonatal Care, WEBMD (July 16, 2009), http://
emedicine.medscape.com/article/978997-overview.
59. POST, BLUSTEIN & DUBLER, supra note 2, at 293–99.
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Pediatrics calls infant bioethics committees) to facilitate decision review and to assist in
60
the interaction among physicians, the family, the hospital, and the state.

The amendment to the federal child-abuse law and subsequent regulations
applying it to neonatal treatment states that
“withholding of medically indicated treatment” means the failure to respond to an
infant’s life-threatening conditions by providing treatment (including appropriate
nutrition, hydration, and medication) which in the treating physician’s reasonable
medical judgment will be most likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all
such conditions. Exceptions to the requirement to provide treatment may be made
only in cases in which one of the following applies:
(i) The infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose.
(ii) The provision of such treatment would merely prolong dying or not be effective in
ameliorating or correcting all of the infant’s life-threatening conditions or otherwise be
futile in terms of the survival of the infant.
(iii) The provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of
61
the infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane.

Add to this complexity that every infant-bioethics committee establishes its
own rules for evaluating the statements and perspectives of the family and care
providers who come together in these cases. Thus, the infant-bioethics review
committee at Montefiore Medical Center–the Albert Einstein College of
Medicine had the following rule: If the medical problem was easily fixable and
intervening was uncontroversial (for example, fixing an esophageal blockage on
a baby with Down syndrome), the committee would recommend the
intervention regardless of the parents’ wishes; if the medical problem was
complex, intractable, and not subject to treatment (for example, fixing the body
of a baby whose gut was born external to the body—gastroschesis62), the
committee would recommend against the intervention regardless of the parents’
wishes; and, in the vast majority of cases where nothing is clear or precise, the
values, beliefs, and wishes of the parents would control. So what might be the
parameters of a principled resolution in this case, and what process could be
used to arrive at a consensus?
In thinking about a principled resolution, consider how you might proceed,
strategically and as a mediator, if the parents wanted “all possible care” and the
care team had decided that this baby’s life would be an experience of ongoing
suffering.
The case seems to require
1. gathering all of the care team and trying to clarify the prognosis—
exactly how long this baby is likely to survive (assuming that this
calculation is not possible, might he be ventilator dependent?);

60. Alan R. Fleischman, Neonatal Care, in THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK
121, 123 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008).
61. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2) (2008) (emphasis added).
62. Kim Hayes et al., G.I. Anomalies in Pediatric and Newborn Care, SURFNEON.COM (Nov. 16,
2005), http://www.surfneon.com/nu/gi.html.
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2. surfacing disagreements about the prognosis among members of the
medical team, and deciding how to convey uncertainty if that is a
factor;
3. determining the “medical facts” while taking into account that
although medical facts “have the ring of scientific objectivity, . . .
determining what counts as a medical fact is a matter of selection
and interpretation, and that process reflects normative
assumptions”;63
4. finding a comfortable room and sitting down with the parents and a
subset of the team so that the parents can talk about themselves
and their family situation, their church and their beliefs, their
experience and fears, and their wants and desires for this baby;
5. discussing the medical facts and the notion that continued care may
not be a clear path for this baby;
6. figuring out if there are any milestones that could help to move the
understanding of the medical facts, for example another attempt at
intubation in a few days;
7. giving permission for the ineffable option of letting this baby die;
8. assuming the burden of that decision without disempowering the
parents;
9. assuring that all involved family members and clergy are invited to
the next meeting; and
10. scheduling a follow-up meeting to review all of the matters again.
C. Parental Intervention in Adolescent-Patient Treatment
1. Fact Pattern
Larissa is a sixteen-year-old girl with longstanding lung disease of
undetermined origin, for which she has been admitted several times over the
past three years. Her treatment on each of her admissions has been similar: She
comes in with an exacerbation of her lung condition, receives steroids, does
fairly well, and is discharged. On this last admission, however, she was found to
have renal failure, for which she has begun to receive dialysis. Her doctor is not
certain how long she will require it—possibly for the rest of her life.
Larissa’s mother is characterized as somewhat suspicious of conventional
medicine, and under the circumstances, this is not unreasonable. She has sought
out alternative treatments with an osteopathic physician from whom Larissa has
received high-dose intravenous hydrogen peroxide and vitamin C. Larissa
received a week of infusions just prior to her latest admission to the hospital.

63. DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 47–48.
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There is a definite possibility that Larissa’s renal failure is due to the
treatments she has received from the osteopathic doctor, but at this point this is
only speculative. There is no definitive evidence that her renal condition is
caused by these alternative treatments. However, the physicians treating her
were in complete agreement that going forward, the treatments must be stopped
because, at this point, they will likely make Larissa’s renal condition worse.
Everyone in the treatment team stated that there is no evidence that the
mom wants to hurt her child: the mom’s unhappiness with the care her daughter
has received is understandable, given that no cause for her lung problem has yet
been found. Larissa’s mom is in a state of shock, having just learned that Larissa
has this new and serious renal problem. It would be counterproductive and
unfair to assign blame to the mom for her daughter’s condition. Yet there may
be a number of treatments that could make the renal condition worse, and all of
them should be monitored carefully or stopped completely—including, but not
limited to, the treatments she has been receiving from the osteopathic physician.
2. Analysis
Treating an adolescent patient presents particular legal and ethical issues for
medical providers. Adolescents do not have the right to consent to or refuse
care that accrues to adults.64 On the other hand, the ethics of adolescent care
developed by the Society of Adolescent Medicine and the American Academy
of Pediatrics dictate that the adolescent know the issues, diagnosis, and
prognosis; participate in the decisions about care; and agree to the treatment or
lack thereof.65
“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are
protected by the Constitution, and possess constitutional rights.”66 This case,
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, was decided in the context of rights to
abortion, which are particularly sensitive in American society. But a right to live
or die is almost as fraught with divergent meaning.67
Most scholars agree that by the age of thirteen, adolescents have the moral
capacities to weigh and measure some of the aspects of treatment. They have
some ability to foresee consequences for themselves and others. What they are

64. See ROBERT S. LAWRENCE, JENNIFER APPLETON GOOTMAN & LESLIE J. SIM, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL AND INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, ADOLESCENT
HEALTH SERVICES: MISSING OPPORTUNITIES 180–81 (2009).
65. See generally AM. MED. ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR ADOLESCENT PREVENTIVE SERVICES:
RECOMMENDATIONS MONOGRAPH (1997).
66. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); see also O’Connor v.
Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 201 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that sensitive medical information is “of the most
intimate kind” and the right to privacy includes the right to maintain medical confidentiality); City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 417 (1983) (holding that a state cannot make a
blanket decision that all minors are too immature to consent to an abortion, or that an abortion may
never be in the minor’s best interests without parental consent).
67. See Annas, supra note 33, at 1710.
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lacking in general experience, some acquire through experience in the medicalcare system through an odyssey in chronic illness.
The legal rule is generally stated as the following: All non-emergency
healthcare requires consent before treatment can be provided.68 When the
patient is a minor child, a parent or legal guardian usually must consent to that
child’s medical treatment. There are some exceptions to this rule of course. For
example, adult caregivers often may consent to medical treatment for children
under their care, even when the caregiver does not have formal legal custody of
the child. In addition, minors may consent to their own care when they meet
certain status conditions, such as being married, or are seeking certain types of
care, such as drug-abuse treatment.69
Adolescents are that midway creation straddling childhood and adult
responsibilities. And the emotional period of adolescence has been extended, at
least for the middle class, as job opportunities decrease and the cost of
independent living increases. Some scholars of adolescence maintain that it now
extends into the early twenties.70 Whatever its extent, the capacity of an
adolescent to understand and appreciate the medical situation facing her, the
risks and benefits of treatment, and the risk of refusing treatment is an everchanging quotient during adolescence.
For this reason, the American Academy of Pediatrics has a guideline that
states that “[t]he physician or health care professional should always seek
consent or assent for medical care from the pediatric patient as appropriate for
the patient’s development, age, and understanding.”71
Finally, consider this statement from the Department of Health and Human
Services:
Laws that affect the minor’s right to consent to medical care have been developed
under the precedent of parental autonomy. In adolescents under the age of majority
who receive health care services, the American Academy of Pediatrics has a longstanding policy statement encouraging physicians and parents to include adolescents in
the decision-making process, but the parental autonomy and parental right to give
72
consent for a minor is the standard.

For this case, consider what should be the process and how a principled
resolution might be characterized. How might the process be constructed?
Would the mom be required to give up her decision-making authority to the
daughter? Can the patient assume this burden? Who would decide, based on
what rules, with what empowerment of the patient, and with what protections
for her?

68. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 129–30 (1914).
69. LAWRENCE, GOOTMAN & SIM, supra note 64, at 180.
70. Id. at 2 n.1.
71. Comm. on Pediatric Emergency Med., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Consent for Emergency Medical
Services for Children and Adolescents, 111 PEDIATRICS 703, 705 (2003).
72. Ann Maradiegue, Minor’s Rights Versus Parental Rights: Review of Legal Issues in Adolescent
Health Care, 48 J. MIDWIFERY & WOMEN’S HEALTH 170, 171 (2003).
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D. Religious Beliefs and Family Involvement
1. Fact Pattern
The patient is a fifty-four-year-old woman who first presented as a new
patient for evaluation of a left-breast mass. She first noticed the mass four
months ago and believed it was getting larger. On examination, she had a hard,
one-centimeter nodule in the left breast. Urgent mammography and fine-needle
aspiration were arranged and the nodule proved to be malignant. The patient
was referred to surgery. She did not return to the internist for a visit scheduled
postoperatively. One month later, the surgeon notified the internist that a
lumpectomy was done showing tumor cells in the margin of the specimen. The
patient was scheduled for definitive surgery, but did not appear on the day of
the procedure and could not be reached. The internist reached the patient who
stated that she understands her condition but believes that she does not need
surgery.
The patient is a devout Christian and she is certain that God will cure her.
After several telephone calls, she agreed to come to the office to discuss her
situation in person. She was well groomed, fully oriented, and had
understanding and insight about the choice she was making. She declined the
doctor’s request to contact members of her family or her church. After this visit,
the patient stopped returning the doctor’s calls. Putting herself in the place of a
possible family member, the doctor worried that perhaps the patient’s judgment
was inappropriately affected by her religious preoccupations and the stress of a
cancer diagnosis. She remained concerned that she should have notified family
members or friends, over the patient’s objections, to give them the opportunity
to be involved in the patient’s decision.
2. Analysis
Again, consider how the mediator should proceed and what might constitute
a principled resolution. How should the process be constructed? Who should be
present when the medical team meets to review the “medical facts”? What if the
patient refuses to join the conversation? Does the responsibility of the medical
staff end with the patient’s refusal to appear? Could there be a mediation?

IV
CONCLUSION
As the American healthcare establishment becomes more complicated,
which will necessarily be the case as the implementation of healthcare reform
proceeds, hospitals and all other healthcare institutions will increasingly
confront misunderstandings of the new regulations, disagreements and disputes
over the fairness and justice of implementing the new law, and conflicts about
the positions that institutions take in this evolving process. These conflicts will
augment already-existing conflicts about who lives, who dies, and who decides.
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The next years are likely to be somewhat chaotic even if ultimately greater
health benefits and improved access to care accrue to more patients. In these
times, institutions should consider bioethics mediators as a vibrant resource for
managing change because they are an invaluable resource for forging principled
resolutions.

